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The Inevitability and Ubiquity of Cycling in 
All Feasible Legal Regimes: A Formal Proof
Leo Katz and Alvaro Sandroni
ABSTRACT
Intransitive choices, or cycling, are generally held to be the mark of irrationality. When a set 
of rules engenders such choices, it is usually held to be irrational and in need of reform. In 
this article, we prove a series of theorems, demonstrating that all feasible legal regimes are 
going to be rife with cycling. Our first result, the legal cycling theorem, shows that unless a 
legal system meets some extremely restrictive conditions, it will lead to cycling. The discussion 
that follows, along with our second result, the combination theorem, shows exactly why these 
conditions are almost impossible to meet. All of this has numerous implications to which we 
can only allude here. For one, it suggests why law is as susceptible to manipulation and ex-
ploitation of loopholes as it has proved to be.
1. INTRODUCTION
Cycling, or intransitivity, is generally viewed as the hallmark of irratio-
nality. To make cyclical choices, the argument goes, is to be incoherent. 
In fact, many an argument in law is built on demonstrating that adopt-
ing certain rules leads to cycling. A fairly straightforward and mundane 
example of how basic is the assumption of transitivity might be a case 
like the following. Suppose a defendant is charged with negligence for 
his choice between two courses of action, x and z. Suppose he is able to 
point to two precedents, the first of which holds that a defendant who 
chooses x over y is not negligent and the second of which holds that a 
defendant who chooses y over z is not negligent as well. He will presum-
ably feel on strong ground arguing that respect for precedent demands 
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that in choosing x over z, he not be found negligent either. That only 
follows, of course, on the assumption of transitivity.1 But the significance 
of transitivity runs deeper: when there is intransitivity, there is room for 
manipulation. If the law permitted a legal actor to choose a over b and 
b over c, it would be awkward if it did not also permit him to choose 
a over c.  If it allowed for such intransitivity, he might manipulate the 
law by changing the order of the choices. More generally, transitivity of 
choice is a central tenet both in economics and in law. Thus, a successful 
challenge to transitivity would open up all kinds of new questions. For 
example, in economics it might lead one to rethink something as basic 
as revealed preferences, namely, how to infer preferences from choices. 
In law, it might lead one to rethink our customary approach to issues of 
form versus substance and the exploitation of loopholes. But that really 
only skims the surface of the arguments and models both in law and in 
economics in which intransitivity plays some role and that might there-
fore require revisiting.
What we seek to demonstrate, with the help of two formal theorems 
and a series of illustrations involving familiar legal systems, is that all re-
motely feasible legal systems, and certainly all that are known to have ex-
isted, are riddled with cycles. Nor are they mere occasional pathologies; 
they are rampant.
Our first theorem, the legal cycling theorem, shows that all legal sys-
tems that are not what we call option stratified will exhibit cycles. We 
then present a number of examples and considerations to substantiate 
the claim that we would not want a legal system that is option stratified. 
Our second theorem, the combination theorem, shows why an option- 
stratified system is almost impossible to construct, even if one wanted to 
go to the trouble of creating one.
Our results, as will become evident quickly, are rooted in social choice 
and therefore bear an interesting, though not straightforward, relation-
ship to Arrow’s famous impossibility theorem, which has already had 
an important impact on law by way of a variety of seminal contribu-
tions such as Spitzer (1979), Easterbrook (1982), Kornhauser and Sager 
(1986), and Miller and Rachmilevitch (2014). But there is one particu-
larly obvious and notable difference between our work and much (but 
1. Let us assume that these precedents are court of appeals decisions, finding negli-
gence absent as a matter of law, rather than factual determinations at the trial court level 
that would not have the required precedential significance.
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not all) of the prior work drawing on social choice, which is that we are 
not here concerned with collective decision making.
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the formal 
notation and shows a full characterization of the legal systems that in-
duce cycles (the legal cycling theorem). Section 3 proceeds to show that 
legal systems induce cycles. Section 4 shows that attempts to change laws 
and eliminate cycles either fail or have implications that are so perverse 
as to be unacceptable. Section 5 lays bare an alternative source of cycling 
in legal regimes, arising from the fact that combining legal doctrines in 
any plausible fashion often leads to cycling (the combination theorem). 
Section 6 explains the relationship of the foregoing to the previous social 
choice and decision-theoretic literature. Section 7 revisits some classic re-
sults, such as Amartya Sen’s liberal paradox and Louis Kaplow and Ste-
ven Shavell’s antifairness theorem, that take on a different significance in 
light of our results. It also draws attention to one of the most important 
reasons that cycles are problematic—the widespread opportunities they 
create for manipulation. Finally, Section 7 provides some examples of the 
kind of restructuring that economics would need to undertake to prop-
erly accommodate the law. However, the full development of these points 
is left for future work. In Section 8, we take up a very general concern 
someone might have about what qualifies as a genuine cycle. Section 9 
concludes. In the Appendix, the results are extended to cases in which a 
decision maker can be indifferent among several options or faces more 
than two options. Proofs are also in the Appendix.
2. THE LEGAL CYCLING THEOREM
We begin by defining an option-stratified legal system. We then show 
that an option-stratified legal system is the only one that is guaranteed 
to avoid cycles. By contrast, a system that is not option stratified is guar-
anteed to exhibit cycling, and, conversely, a system that exhibits cycling 
is guaranteed not to be option stratified. Thus, a legal system is free of 
cycles if and only if it is option stratified. After that, we show why all 
feasible legal systems are bound not to be option stratified—and therefore 
bound to exhibit cycling.
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2.1. Option-Stratified Legal Systems
Let A be a finite set of alternatives. An issue B is a subset of A with two 
distinct elements. Therefore, if x ∈ A, y ∈ A, and x ≠ y, then the subset 
B = {x, y} of A is an issue. Let  be the set of issues. A legal system is a 
mapping  that takes an issue B as input and returns, as output, a non-
empty subset (B) of B. Thus, a legal system is a mapping  :  →   
A such that ∅ ≠ (B) Í B. If there are two available options x and y, 
then both of them may be legal or only one of them may be legal. The 
legal system  determines which options are legal: ({x, y}) are the le-
gal alternatives when the available options are x and y. If ({x, y}) = {x, 
y}, then both x and y are legal. If ({x, y}) = {x}, then only x is legal. In 
the Appendix, these definitions and corresponding results are extended 
to choices with more than two options. Let  be the set of real numbers.
Definition 1. A legal system  is option stratified if there is a utility 
function u : A →  such that
 ({ , }) { , } ( ) ( )x y x y u x u y= =if  
and
 ({ , }) { } ( ) ( ).x y x u x u y= >if  
In other words, a legal system is option stratified if there is a function 
that ranks all theoretically possible alternatives from top to bottom and if 
someone, choosing from a feasible subset of all these options, is obliged 
to choose the highest-ranking one.2 An option outranked by another is 
illegal. The highest-ranking choices are not necessarily unique. If two al-
ternatives have the same (top) rank, then they are both legal.
2.2. The Law-Abiding Citizen
A law-abiding citizen is a rational agent who is constrained by the law. Let 
P be the preference order (that is, a complete and transitive binary relation 
over all alternatives) of a law-abiding citizen. It ranks all feasible alter-
natives from top to bottom, and x P y denotes a preference for x over y. 
We also assume that P is asymmetric. This rules out indifference between 
alternatives and, so, rules out spurious cycles in which, for example, the 
decision maker is indifferent between three legal alternatives and chooses 
2. The existence of a representation by a utility function is often referred to as ratio-
nalizable. We use the term “option stratified” for legal systems to not confound it with 
terms used in different contexts.
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them in a cycle. In the Appendix, we extend our results to the case in 
which indifference is allowed.
A choice function C is a mapping that takes an issue B as input and 
returns, as output, a single element C(B) ∈ B. Thus, a choice function is a 
mapping C :  → A such that C(B) ∈ B. The law-abiding citizen chooses 
the best option among the legal ones. Thus, given the law-abiding cit-
izen’s asymmetric preference order P and the legal system , the law- 
abiding citizen’s choice function CP, is such that CP,B ∈ (B), and if y ∈ 
(B) and y ≠ CP,(B), then CP,(B) P y.
Hence, CP,(B) optimizes P on (B). When it is clear that we refer to 
the choice function of the law-abiding citizen (and not an arbitrary choice 
function), we may drop the subscript P, to ease the notation. So, between 
x and y, the choice of the law-abiding citizen is x (that is, C({x, y}) = x) 
if and only if either x is the only legal alternative (that is, ({x, y}) = {x}) 
or both alternatives are legal (that is, ({x, y}) = {x, y}) and x is preferred 
over y (that is, x P y).
The choices of law-abiding citizens are based on two principles. 
Law-abiding citizens are completely rational and order all options with 
strict preferences. As mentioned, this avoids spurious cycles arising for 
uninteresting reasons such as indifference or cyclical preferences on the 
part of the citizen. Moreover, law-abiding citizens respect the law and 
do not choose illegal options. They pick their top-ranked option among 
those that are feasible and legal. We now turn to the question of whether 
the choices of a law-abiding citizen can be cyclic.
Definition 2. A choice function C is cyclic if there exist three distinct 
alternatives x, y, and z such that C({x, y}) = x, C({y, z}) = y, and C({x, z}) 
= z. The cycle of length 3 is without loss of generality because if there are 
cycles of any length, then there must also be one of length 3.
Definition 3. A legal system  induces cycles if there exists a prefer-
ence order P such that the resulting choice function CP, of a law-abiding 
citizen is cyclic.
We speak of a legal system inducing cycles to make it clear that we 
are dealing with perfectly rational decision makers. If there were no law, 
as in the special case of a legal system that makes all options legal, there 
would be no cycles.
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2.3. Main Result
Legal Cycling Theorem. Consider the case in which there are at least 
three distinct alternatives. Then no option-stratified legal system induces 
cycles. However, any legal system that is not option stratified induces cy-
cles. 
The legal cycling theorem is a full characterization of the legal sys-
tems that induce cycles. The upshot of the theorem is this: a legal sys-
tem needs to tell a citizen which among a set of options he faces is legal. 
One possible way of picturing his situation is the option-stratified system. 
Namely, we assume that there is a ranking of all possible options that cit-
izens might face, and we picture the legal system as requiring a citizen to 
choose the highest-ranked option among those available to him. If several 
are ranked equally highly, he gets to choose among them as he pleases, 
that is, in accordance with his preferences. It is probably fairly intuitive 
that this type of system, which so closely resembles the usual choice situ-
ation in economics, will not lead to cycling. What seems less intuitive and 
more interesting is the second part of the legal cycling theorem—that a 
legal regime that is not susceptible to cycling will necessarily be capable 
of being reduced to this picture; in other words, unless it can be thought 
of as option stratified, it will necessarily exhibit cycles.
3. CYCLING IN LEGAL REGIMES
Let us now look at examples of cycles as they arise under the common 
law. We look at four legal doctrines and some cycles they each can gener-
ate: duress, self-defense, necessity, and negligence. These doctrines are in 
no way peculiar to the common law. Every legal regime known to us, in-
deed every legal regime conceivable to us, has these doctrines. They seem 
to represent basic, culture-insensitive facets of human morality that legal 
regimes cannot but help reflect. After presenting these doctrines and the 
cycles to which they give rise, we explore two strategies that might get rid 
of the cycles. The first strategy, consistent with the legal cycling theorem, 
fails and simply results in producing new and different cycles. The sec-
ond strategy succeeds but, consistent with the theorem, renders the sys-
tem option stratified. This second kind of failure is particularly important 
to understand because it reveals just why option-stratified systems are not 
really feasible.
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3.1. Cycling and Duress
The defense of duress is available to a defendant who was pressured into 
committing a crime with the threat of serious pain or injury. If, for in-
stance, someone were threatened with being subjected to serious burns 
unless he helped in a bank robbery, he would probably have the duress 
defense available to him. To be sure, the defense is not available unless 
the threat is sufficiently serious. Merely being threatened with something 
that one considers extremely disadvantageous is not enough. If someone 
is threatened with the destruction of a piece of property he greatly trea-
sures, even a manuscript he has been working on for many years, that 
almost surely does not qualify.
The duress defense induces a cycle in the following way. Imagine that 
the defendant happens to value his manuscript so highly that if a fire were 
to break out that threatened to consume it, he would not hesitate to rush 
into the burning building to salvage it, even at the cost of suffering se-
rious burns. Now we get the following cycle: When choosing between 
letting the manuscript be destroyed or suffering burn wounds, the de-
fendant will choose to suffer burn wounds. When choosing between suf-
fering burn wounds or participating in the bank robbery, the defendant 
will choose to participate in the bank robbery, which is permitted by the 
duress defense. Alas, when choosing between participating in the bank 
robbery and seeing his treasured manuscript be destroyed by gangsters, 
he will choose to let his manuscript be destroyed—because that is what 
the law expects of him under the circumstances, there being no duress 
defense if he makes the contrary decision. Here then the legal system in-
duces a cycle; that is, it produces intransitive choices in someone who 
makes rational decisions while subjecting himself to its rules.
The legal cycling theorem implies that the root cause of this cycle is 
that the doctrine of duress does not allow the legal system to be option 
stratified. Now why exactly is that? A key property that any option- 
stratified system has, but actual legal systems do not, is the following: if 
when we choose between option x and option y, choosing either is legal, 
and when choosing between y and z, either is legal as well, then when 
choosing between x and z, both must be legal as well. Put formally, 
   ({ , }) { , } ({ , }) { , } ({ , }) { , }.x y x y y z y z x z x z= = Þ =and   (1)
Let us call this property context independence, CI. If CI is absent, we 
may have
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   ({ , }) { , }, ({ , }) { , }, ({ , }) { }.x y x y y z y z x z z= = =and  (2)
Let us call this property context dependence, CD. Duress does not satisfy 
CI: given the choice between manuscript and burns, the legal system per-
mits either. Given the choice between committing robbery and burns, the 
legal system permits either. But given the choice between manuscript and 
committing robbery, it permits only one. It is the interaction of this fact 
with the legal actor’s preferences that generates the cycle.
Context independence must be satisfied by any option-stratified legal 
system because for any function u, u(x) = u(y) and u(y) = u(z) imply 
that u(x) = u(z). However, in this example, option x is to participate in 
the bank robbery, option y is to suffer severe burns, and option z is to 
lose the manuscript. So ({x, y}) = {x, y} because under the doctrine of 
duress, both participating in the bank robbery and enduring severe burns 
are legal. In addition, ({y, z}) = {y, z} because the choice between the 
burns and the manuscript concerns only the decision maker, and both 
options are legal. Finally, ({x, z}) = {z} because the duress defense does 
not apply to participation in the bank robbery if the alternative is to lose 
a manuscript. That is, CI does not hold. Instead, CD holds, and the legal 
system is not option stratified.
This is worth restating: the legal system here is not option strati-
fied mainly because the defense of duress is context dependent. That is, 
whether the defense of duress applies depends not only on what is done 
and its consequences but also on the available alternatives. The defense 
of duress for participating in the bank robbery (option x) holds if the 
alternative is y (to suffer severe burns) but not if it is z (to lose the man-
uscript). When this CD interacts with the decision maker’s exercise of 
his preferences, a cycle results. To summarize, whenever the law satisfies 
property (2), CD, and a law-abiding citizen ranks x above y above z, 
then, consistent with the legal cycling theorem, the resulting choices pro-
duce the following cycle:
 C x y x C y z y C x z z({ , }) , ({ , }) , ({ , }) .= = =and   (3)
3.2. Cycling and Necessity
The defense of necessity is similar in structure but different in content 
from the defense of duress. It is available to someone who has a difficult 
choice to make and chooses to break the law rather than suffer or inflict 
some serious harm that is more serious than the harm that the law he 
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is breaking is seeking to prevent. In other words, if he can do substan-
tially more good than harm by breaking the law, he is permitted to do so. 
(Note that this is different from the duress defense, which applies even 
when one is doing more harm than that with which one is threatened.) If, 
for instance, someone is hiking in the mountains and can avoid starvation 
only by breaking into a mountain cabin to help himself to its supplies, 
the defense of necessity would exonerate him. Like the defense of duress, 
necessity is available only if the injury being prevented by committing the 
offense is sufficiently serious.
We can generate a cycle because any context-dependent law is prone 
to cycles, and the necessity defense evidently is context dependent: When 
choosing between committing a moderately serious crime or suffering 
the risk of a dire calamity, the defendant is allowed to do either. When 
choosing between committing a moderately serious crime or suffering 
some noncalamitous minor setback, he can choose only the latter. But 
when choosing between the noncalamitous minor setback and the risk of 
a major calamity, he once again can choose either. That violates CI and, 
hence, guarantees the possibility of a cycle.
What might such a cycle look like? To see how this might happen, let 
us refine the mountain cabin example somewhat. Suppose that to make 
this a reasonably safe climb or, rather, to ensure the safety of his descent, 
which is the harder part, the hiker needs a certain type of equipment, 
which he lacks. His desire to climb, however, is sufficiently great that he 
chooses to embark on the climb anyway. Somewhat more formally, given 
the choice between alternative z, forgoing the climb, and alternative y, 
risking death, he chooses the latter. Now suppose that when he reaches 
the mountaintop, he comes across a cabin that happens to contain the 
equipment necessary for a safe descent. He now faces the choice between 
alternative y, risking death, and a new alternative x, breaking into the 
cabin and helping himself to that equipment. Because he is able to invoke 
the defense of necessity, he chooses x over y. Now finally suppose that 
he were to find himself confronting the choice between alternative x and 
alternative z, that is, between breaking into the mountain cabin, on the 
one hand, or forgoing the climb, on the other. He would therefore not be 
able to claim the necessity defense and would therefore decline to choose 
alternative x, breaking into the cabin to obtain climbing equipment, over 
alternative z, forgoing the climb.
The logic underlying the cycle induced by the necessity doctrine is the 
same as for the cycle induced by the duress doctrine. In both cases, the 
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resulting law is not option stratified because property (1), CI, does not 
hold. Instead, property (2), CD, holds. The doctrine of necessity is also 
context dependent. Whether the defense of necessity applies depends on 
what is done, its consequences, and the available alternatives. The de-
fense of necessity for breaking into the cabin (alternative x) holds if the 
alternative is y, an unsafe descent, but not if it is z, forgoing the climb.
3.3. Cycling and Self-Defense
To avoid getting seriously injured from someone’s attack on him, the de-
fendant is allowed to seriously injure him in turn. He is not in general 
allowed to defend an attack on his property—for example, his manu-
script—by the use of deadly force, which refers to force that might seri-
ously injure the attacker (as opposed to killing him). Now suppose that 
he is willing to incur serious injury to protect his manuscript from great 
harm. Once again, a cycle is generated. We would observe the defendant, 
when choosing between getting injured and suffering damage to his man-
uscript, choosing to get injured instead. When choosing between getting 
injured and injuring his attacker, we would observe the defendant choos-
ing the latter—injuring his attacker (as he is permitted to do by the doc-
trine of self-defense). When choosing between injuring someone who is 
about to destroy his manuscript and permitting him to destroy the man-
uscript, he would choose the latter, because that is what the law of self- 
defense requires of him. In short, the doctrine of self-defense induces a 
cycle.
In this example, the cycle induced by the doctrine of self-defense 
has the same logical structure as those induced by duress and necessity. 
Self-defense is also context dependent. To use deadly force on the at-
tacker (x) is legal if the alternative is to incur a serious injury (y) but not 
if it is to have the manuscript damaged (z). Moreover, if the options are y 
and z, then they are both legal. Thus, property (2), CD, holds. It follows 
that the legal system is not option stratified, and if a law-abiding citizen 
ranks x above y above z, then the resulting choices produce the cycle in 
cycle (3).
3.4. Cycling and Negligence
The doctrine of negligence imposes liability on those who harm others 
through negligent actions. Negligence is generally understood to be the 
unjustifiable imposition of risk. Criteria of justifiability vary. A com-
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monly invoked one is the Hand formula: does the benefit of taking a pre-
caution exceed its cost?
We should expect negligence to generate cycles because it too is not 
option stratified and therefore violates CI. Given the choice between suf-
fering a very small risk x or suffering a large risk y, the legal actor can 
choose whichever he pleases (assuming no one else is affected). Given the 
choice between imposing a small risk z on someone or suffering a large 
risk y himself, then, assuming y is sufficiently large, he can do either. But 
given the choice between imposing a small risk z on someone else or suf-
fering a very small risk x himself, he can choose only the latter. That 
means that negligence violates CI, and a cycle can be constructed.
Here is a somewhat involved example of such a cycle: Let us imag-
ine an athlete who suffers an accident during a sports event. If he were 
to continue playing, he runs the risk of permanent injury. He chooses 
to continue to play. In other words, between alternative z, forgoing the 
game, and y, risking permanent injury, he chooses y. Presumably that is 
a choice he is entitled to make, since he is the only affected party. Now 
suppose that, after he has chosen y and has finished the game, it turns 
out that the risk of permanent injury could in fact be averted if he were 
swiftly brought to an emergency room by an aggressively driven ambu-
lance but that such an ambulance would be operating at a significant risk 
to numerous bystanders. We will assume, however, that this is a trade-off 
that the Hand formula would endorse and that would therefore not be 
judged negligent. This means that, between alternative y, risking perma-
nent injury to the athlete, and alternative x, imposing a significant risk 
on numerous bystanders, the athlete would be permitted to opt for x. 
Finally, let us imagine a scenario in which he has to choose between x 
and z. How might that happen? Well, let us suppose that the accident 
he suffers does not pose a risk of permanent injury but simply takes him 
out of the game unless he is provided with certain equipment or treat-
ment, which could be provided in time only by sending a car to the sta-
dium that would have to be driven in the same aggressive manner as the 
ambulance, posing the same risk to bystanders. Presumably that would 
not be allowed. In other words, between imposing the self-same risk on 
bystanders as the ambulance, alternative x, and forgoing playing in the 
second half of the game, alternative z, he is obligated to choose the lat-
ter. (Put more simply, imposing the self-same risk on bystanders for the 
sake of averting permanent injury is permitted, but doing so for the sake 
of continuing the game is not. However, since he is allowed to not avert 
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the risk of permanent injury rather than forgo playing the game, a cycle 
is generated.)
Although the examples are very particular, they are constructed from 
a very general recipe that can be widely applied, which means that there 
is nothing rare or unusual about these cycles. The recipe is the following: 
There are a series of options about which a decision maker cares to vary-
ing degrees—for example, his manuscript, his physical safety, and not 
getting involved in a bank robbery. Each of these options has, in common 
moral and legal parlance, an interest associated with it; that is, in describ-
ing the situation, we are led to refer to the decision maker’s interest in his 
manuscript, his interest in his physical safety, and the bank’s interest in 
not being robbed. The relevant legal rules provide a ranking of these in-
terests. They would generally put the bank’s interest in not being robbed 
ahead of the defendant’s interest in not having his manuscript destroyed, 
they would put the defendant’s interest in his physical safety ahead of his 
interest in his manuscript, and they would put the defendant’s interest 
in his physical safety ahead of the bank’s interest in not being robbed. 
That is of course a perfectly transitive ranking. What induces the cycle is 
that in choosing between the manuscript and his body, the defendant is 
allowed to choose what he prefers more rather than that in which he has 
the greater legal interest. Any time we inject the possibility of someone’s 
choosing what he has a lesser interest in, but greater desire for, over what 
he has a greater interest in, but lesser desire for, a cycle like the above 
may result.
Using the conceptual framework of the proof of the legal cycle theo-
rem, we can appreciate more clearly what gives rise to cycles. What we 
call interests correspond to a function that ranks all options. So if the 
options are (a) his manuscript, (b) his physical safety, and (c) not being 
involved in a bank robbery, his interests rank b over c over a. However, 
the law does not require him to always take the highest-interest option. 
In this example, this is so only in the case of the choice between a and c 
(where he is required to choose c). The other choices are left to the deci-
sion maker. Hence, even if interests are perfectly ranked, legality is not, at 
least on occasion, determined by the ranking of interests. Sometimes the 
decision maker is allowed to choose an option of lower interest (for ex-
ample, b has higher interest than a, but our law-abiding citizen chooses a 
over b). Thus, the law is not option stratified and thereby induces cycles.
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4. WHY OPTION-STRATIFIED SYSTEMS ARE UNACCEPTABLE: THE 
NONRESPONSIVENESS PROBLEM
It will prove illuminating to consider some of the strategies people might 
follow to try to eliminate cycles. One strategy that probably suggests it-
self arises from a powerful, but as it turns out false, intuition regarding 
the root cause of these cycles. It might seem, for instance, that what gen-
erates the duress cycle is the law’s rigid assumption that physical safety 
is always more precious than property. It might seem as though the cycle 
could be made to disappear by simply making the law less rigid or coarse 
grained, by making the availability of the duress defense depend not on 
the specific injury being threatened but on the amount of disutility asso-
ciated with the injury. Thus, one might say that because the loss of the 
treasured manuscript is as serious to this particular defendant as physical 
injury is to most other people, he gets to invoke duress when it is threat-
ened. Correspondingly, one might say that because his physical safety is 
less precious to him than it is to other people, he does not get to invoke 
the duress defense when that is what is threatened. So long as the defen-
dant chooses the manuscript over physical safety, it seems as though the 
cycle has been made to disappear.
Alas, a closely related cycle can still be constructed. Suppose the de-
fendant has the choice between doing something that puts his manuscript 
at risk or puts his body at risk. Inasmuch as his manuscript is more pre-
cious to him than his body, we would expect him to put his body at risk. 
However, that does not take into account the effect that the legal rules 
have on his decision. Inasmuch as he is entitled to protect his manuscript 
much more extensively than he is entitled to protect his body—that is, he 
is entitled to participate in a bank robbery to avoid its destruction—this 
might well lead him to choose to put his manuscript at risk rather than 
his body. The cycle has now been recreated. It should be apparent that 
an analogous argument can be made about each of the other cycles. If 
we tried to modify the doctrines of self-defense, necessity, and negligence 
by re formulating the law in terms of disutility rather than specific objects 
(like the body or property), a similar reformulation of the cycle is pos-
sible. This is just a special case of the familiar phenomenon of someone 
making himself more vulnerable because that entitles him to certain spe-
cial benefits.
Let us now see what happens if we try to eliminate cycles through a 
different approach. More concretely, let us try to turn our cycle-prone 
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legal system into an option-stratified system. As shown by the legal 
cycling theorem, this is the only strategy that can effectively eliminate 
cycles. However, it has extremely unattractive implications. In this sense, 
this is the more important strategy to explore because it helps reveal why 
option-stratified legal systems are not really acceptable.
One of the chief difficulties presented by an option-stratified system is 
what we call the nonresponsiveness problem. To be an option- stratified 
legal system, it has to be the case that whenever we allow a decision 
maker to choose between various alternatives, they have to be on a par 
as far as the legal system is concerned. The legal system ranks all alterna-
tives and requires the decision maker to choose among the highest-ranked 
available options. He has leeway only if there are several equally ranked 
options.
Now let us imagine the following. The decision maker faces certain 
alternatives x, y, and z. Each of these alternatives carries certain costs and 
benefits—that is, pros and cons —but only for him. They have no effect 
on anyone else. Presumably we would want him to be able to choose be-
tween these. We would in general—maybe not invariably—want a system 
to allow him to choose among alternatives that affect only him. Pater-
nalism and other considerations might impose some limitations, but we 
do not require that all choices that produce negligible effects on others 
be legal. We require only that some of these choices be legal. Assuming 
that we want this to be the case, then, in order for the system to be op-
tion stratified (and, thus, cycle free), these options have to be deemed to 
be on a par as far as the legal system’s ranking is concerned. So consider 
a choice between x and y and assume that, if these are the available op-
tions, they are both legal. Then, if the law is option stratified, they must 
be equally ranked—or the decision maker cannot freely choose among 
them.
Next let us picture a situation in which a further option w is injected. 
This option has significant consequences for others, or rather, choosing 
w means sparing that other person certain risks or costs. This is the typ-
ical kind of situation contemplated by the negligence doctrine: either the 
defendant does what generates certain benefits for him (option x), or he 
does what avoids the risk to others but deprives him of his benefits (op-
tion w). Unlike the choice between x and y, the choice between x and w 
does have consequences for others. In the latter case, to choose x means 
to reject w and so to let another incur certain risks. Let us suppose that he 
would be permitted to choose x over w. Presumably that would be based 
This content downloaded from 130.091.146.055 on June 07, 2018 13:33:04 PM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
C Y C L I N G  I N  L E G A L  R E G I M E S  /  251
on some sort of comparison between the benefits to him of x and the risks 
to the other person if he rejects w.
Next let us suppose that he faces the choice between y and w. The y 
option is associated with a different package of costs and benefits for our 
defendant. Depending on exactly how those costs and benefits compare 
with those associated with the w option (which affect the other person 
in this setup), we might or might not want to let the defendant choose y 
over w. And yet, if the system is option stratified, he must treat x, y, and 
z as equivalents. If we allow him to choose x over w, we must also allow 
him to choose y over w and z over w, or we give rise to cycles. Hence, if 
x is, say, worth $1 million to the decision maker, and y is, say, worth $1, 
and z is worth a negative amount, then, when the alternative is to spare 
someone some risks, he is allowed to do either any one of these or none 
of them. In sum, the negligence doctrine would have to be insensitive, or 
totally nonresponsive, to use a slightly more technical term, to the de-
gree of benefit an option has for the decision maker when determining 
whether he is allowed to choose it, which seems bizarre.
Nothing in this hinges on the particular doctrines being considered. 
The doctrines of necessity, self-defense, and duress, if they were to be-
come option stratified, would have to be equally nonresponsive to crucial 
attributes of an option. Virtually all sensible legal doctrines one can think 
of involve comparing option w with option x (if those are the available 
ones), on some basis or other, to decide which the defendant is entitled 
to choose; they will involve comparing option w with option y (if those 
are the available ones) to decide which the defendant is entitled to choose 
among the two, and they will come to different conclusions if x and y are 
sufficiently different. This, however, is precluded if doctrines are to be 
part of an option-stratified legal system.
5. WHY OPTION-STRATIFIED SYSTEMS ARE IMPOSSIBLE, OR NEARLY SO
In this section, we show the difficulty of combining two or more doc-
trines to produce an option-stratified system, even if neither doctrine by 
itself induces cycling. The only significant precondition of our result is 
one we call doctrinal unanimity. That is, when all doctrines agree on 
which options should be legal, the legal system must do what they all 
agree on rather than the opposite. While not restricted to this case, the 
difficulty we lay bare is a particularly interesting phenomenon when there 
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is no direct inconsistency between the doctrines being combined. Let us 
suppose that they concern themselves with different subjects and are in 
full agreement to the extent that they overlap in what they cover. In other 
words, where one doctrine applies, the other doctrine either does not ap-
ply or, if it does, produces the same result. Nevertheless, when they are 
combined, they induce cycles.
Let us start with the observation that an individual doctrine may not 
be applicable to all issues. For example, doctrines regarding copyright 
infringements may not be applicable to determine the legality of issues 
regarding the use of deadly force. Henceforth, a doctrine D is a mapping 
D :  →   A  {n/a} such that, for every B ∈ , if D(B) ≠ n/a, then ∅ ≠ 
D(B) Í B; moreover, D(B) ≠ n/a for some issue B. The expression D(B) = 
n/a refers to the case in which the doctrine D is nonapplicable and thus si-
lent over which options are legal on an issue B (thus, one can think of the 
case D(B) = n/a as equivalent to the case in which D(B) is an empty set). 
If D(B) ≠ n/a, then the doctrine is applicable and expresses a viewpoint 
on the legality of different options when several B options are the feasible 
choices. In this case, D(B) are the options that doctrine D deems legal.
Definition 4. A doctrine D is a conditionally option-stratified doc-
trine if there exists a utility function u : A →  such that, whenever D(B) 
≠ n/a,
 D ({ , }) { , } ( ) ( )x y x y u x u y= =if   (4)
and
 D ({ , }) { } ( ) ( ).x y x u x u y= >if    (5)
Like an option-stratified legal system, a conditionally option-stratified 
doctrine also ranks all possible alternatives, and, whenever the doctrine is 
applicable, an option outranked by another feasible one is illegal. If two 
alternatives have the same (top) rank, then they are both legal, provided 
that the doctrine is applicable. Legality here refers, naturally, to the view-
point expressed by the doctrine and not by the final legal system.
We assume that the doctrines we are addressing in this section are 
conditionally option-stratified doctrines. This assumption is not necessary 
for our main result, which holds even if we make no assumptions about 
the doctrines. However, restricting ourselves to conditionally option- 
stratified doctrines makes the results clearer for the following reason: Let 
us say that a legal system  is consistent with a doctrine D if (B) = 
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D(B) when D(B) ≠ n/a. Then a legal system is consistent with a doctrine 
when the legal system agrees with the doctrine, when the doctrine is ap-
plicable. If a legal system  is consistent with a doctrine D that is not a 
conditionally option-stratified doctrine, then the legal system  is not an 
option-stratified system (and so induces cycles). This follows because for 
any utility u, rules (4) and (5) cannot hold in the entire domain of issues 
if they do not hold in the subdomain of issues where the doctrine is appli-
cable. Conversely, if a doctrine D is a conditionally option- stratified doc-
trine, then some option-stratified legal systems can adopt it. The adopting 
legal system can be directly constructed with the utility function u (of the 
conditionally option-stratified doctrine D) and rules (4) and (5). Thus, 
if doctrines are restricted to be conditionally option-stratified doctrines, 
then no single doctrine, by itself, makes the final legal system not  option 
stratified. Thus, no conditionally option-stratified doctrine, by itself, nec-
essarily induces cycles. This restriction makes clear that the difficulty 
in combining doctrines to construct an option-stratified legal system is 
above and beyond the difficulty in ensuring that each doctrine, taken by 
itself, is a conditionally option-stratified doctrine.
Let D be the set of all doctrines and L be the set of all legal systems. 
An aggregator α is a function α : Dn → L that maps a profile of doc-
trines (D1, . . . , Dn) into a legal system .
Definition 5. An aggregator α maps conditionally option-stratified 
doctrines into option-stratified legal systems if the legal system  = α(D1, 
. . . , Dn) is an option-stratified legal system whenever the doctrines (Di , 
. . . , Dn), are all conditionally option-stratified doctrines.
The key condition on α is that it produces option-stratified legal sys-
tems. As mentioned, the proviso that this needs to be so only when the 
doctrines themselves are conditionally option-stratified doctrines makes 
the results stronger and clearer.
Definition 6. An aggregator α satisfies doctrinal unanimity if for any 
options x and y, (B) = Dk(B) whenever these three conditions hold:  
= α(D1, . . . , Dn); Dk(B) ≠ n/a for some k = 1, . . . , n; and Di(B) = Dj(B) 
for all i = 1, . . . , n and j = 1, . . . , n such that Di(B) ≠ n/a and Dj(B) ≠ 
n/a.
Thus, an aggregator satisfies doctrinal unanimity if, whenever all ap-
plicable doctrines agree on what the law should be on an issue, then this 
is the final law on this issue. It may seem natural to assume that (B) = B 
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if Di(B) ≠ n/a for all i = 1, . . . , n. That is, when no doctrine is applica-
ble, then all options are legal. However, we do not need this assumption 
and do not make it.
Proposition 1. Assume that there are three or more options and n ≥ 
2 (so at least two doctrines must be aggregated into a final legal system). 
Then no aggregator satisfies doctrinal unanimity and maps conditional 
option-stratified doctrines into option-stratified legal systems.
Under doctrinal unanimity, it is impossible to aggregate more than 
one doctrine and ensure that the final legal system is option stratified. 
Hence, the sense in which option-stratified legal systems are infeasible is 
not physical impossibility. Rather, it is that more than one doctrine can 
potentially be used in the construction of a legal system. As long as there 
are two or more doctrines, it is not possible to aggregate them and ensure 
that we end up with an option-stratified system. This follows as long as 
the aggregation process satisfies doctrinal unanimity. No other conditions 
are required. Proposition 1 then yields the ineradicability of cycles, which 
results in the combination theorem.
Combination Theorem. Assume that there are at least three options. 
If multiple doctrines are aggregated under doctrinal unanimity, then it is 
impossible to ensure that the final legal system will not induce cycles.
The combination theorem, as stated, requires that any doctrine be ag-
gregated under doctrinal unanimity. Let us now illustrate the combina-
tion theorem with examples based on existing doctrines. We offer three 
examples to illustrate this result. The first example is very abstract and 
schematic. Indeed, it can be thought of as a slightly simplified version of 
our proof. The second is more concrete but sufficiently generic to indicate 
that the result should be expected to apply in a wide variety of contexts.
Let us consider three possible alternatives x, y, and z, as indicated by 
the vertices in Figure 1. There is a doctrine D1 that ranks z above x; 
in other words, it states that given the choice between x and z, only z 
is legal. The line running from x to z, with the arrow pointing toward 
z, is meant to indicate that. The doctrine ranks x and y equally, which 
means that in a choice between x and y, it declares both to be legal. The 
lines running from x to y, with arrows pointing toward both x and y, are 
meant to indicate that. There is no line connecting y and z because the 
doctrine does not apply to that choice. The doctrine D1 could be made 
into an option-stratified system if we simply made it complete and transi-
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tive by drawing such a line between y and z, with the arrow pointing to-
ward z. That possibility is what makes D1 a conditional option-stratified 
doctrine.
Next let us consider doctrine D2 (see Figure 2). The lines between y 
and z, with arrows pointing toward each, indicate that D2 ranks y and z 
equally. In other words, if those two alternatives were to present them-
selves, D2 would deem both to be legal. The lines between y and x indi-
cate that D2 ranks them both as equally legal. No lines run between x 
and z because the doctrine is inapplicable to that choice. This doctrine 
too could be rendered completely transitive by extending it, namely, by 
saying that according to D2, in a choice between x and z, both are legal. 
In other words, D2 is a conditional option-stratified doctrine.
What about combining the two doctrines, consistent with the princi-
ple of doctrinal unanimity? That would mean that both x and y are legal 
(if they present themselves together), because the two doctrines agree on 
that (that is, according to doctrinal unanimity). If y and z were to present 
themselves together, both would be legal, because according to the only 
applicable doctrine, D2, that would be true. On the other hand, if x and 
z presented themselves together, only z would be legal, because according 
to the only applicable doctrine, D1, that would be true. Combining D1 
and D2 consistent with doctrinal unanimity yields the example presented 
in Figure 3. That is, property (1), CI, does not hold. Instead, property (2), 
Figure 1. Example of the combination theorem: doctrine D1
Figure 2. Example of the combination theorem: doctrine D2 
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CD, holds. But that means that the legal system that emerges from com-
bining D1 and D2 is no longer an option-stratified system and therefore 
(because of the legal cycling theorem) is vulnerable to cycling.
Now let us make up a more concrete example by the simple strategy 
of filling D1 and D2 with specific doctrinal content. Let us suppose that 
x, y, and z are three patients, any two of which might conceivably present 
themselves simultaneously for treatment in an emergency room, requiring 
the doctor in attendance to make a triage judgment as to whom to treat 
first. We will assume that this decision about priority of treatment really 
matters to the outcome. Let us assume, moreover, that their injuries are 
of roughly equal severity. Let us also assume that two of them, x and z, 
were involved in a boating accident, x being the officer on that boat and 
z a passenger. Finally, let us assume that y is also a ship’s officer, though 
not on the boat involved in this accident.
We could imagine there to be two choice doctrines relevant to this 
situation. The doctrine D–special duty (D-SP) provides as follows: “Be-
tween patients, where one of them owes a special duty to the other (as 
captains do to passengers, and doctors to patients, and so forth), the one 
who is owed the duty generally gets priority. Where both belong to the 
same professional class (for example, both are doctors, or both are ships’ 
officers), priority is to be given according to needs and likelihood of ben-
efiting from treatment.” The doctrine D-triage (D-T) provides as follows: 
“Between patients with no special relationship, or patients belonging to 
the same professional class (for example, both are doctors, or both are 
ships’ officers), priority is to be given according to needs and likelihood 
of benefiting from treatment.”
Note that D-SP and D-T overlap a bit, as legal doctrines often do, al-
though the area of overlap does not seem problematic because they pro-
vide for the same thing with regard to the contingency where they overlap 
(the case in which both patients belong to the same professional class). 
Now let us consider each doctrine a bit more closely.
Figure 3. Example of the combination theorem: doctrine D3 
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Let us take a closer look at D-SP. The doctrine D-SP would require 
that, between x and z, z be treated ahead of x, since z is a passenger and 
x is an officer on the ship on which z was injured and therefore owes him 
a special duty. The doctrine D-SP would require that, between x and y, 
either could be treated first, since they are both ships’ officers. As for the 
choice between y and z, D-SP does not apply because there is no special 
duty and they do not belong to the same professional class. The doc-
trine D-SP is conditionally option stratified because we could make it an 
 option-stratified system simply by requiring that in a choice between y 
and z, z should be the only legal alternative.
Let us now take a closer look at D-T. The doctrine D-T would find 
that between x and y, both being ships’ officers, needs and likelihood of 
benefit should decide, and since these are equal, choosing either x or y 
would be legal. Between y and z, there being no special relationship be-
tween them, and their not belonging to the same professional class, needs 
and likelihood of benefit will decide. Since those are equal, giving priority 
to either y or z would be legal. Between x and z, the doctrine would sim-
ply not apply, since there is a special relationship between them. The doc-
trine D-T is also conditionally option stratified because we could make it 
an option-stratified system by simply requiring that in a choice between x 
and z, both should be legal.
What happens if we combine the doctrines? In the choice between x 
and y, the two doctrines agree that both should be legal, and therefore 
they both would be. In the choice between y and z, the only applicable 
doctrine, D-T, declares both options to be legal, and therefore they both 
would be. Alas, in the choice between x and z, the only applicable doc-
trine, D-SP, declares only z to be legal. This means that the combination 
D-SP/D-T legal regime is not an option-stratified system and therefore, 
according to the legal cycling theorem, vulnerable to cycles.
Our third example is meant to illustrate that the impossibility of com-
bining doctrines to form an option-stratified legal system holds regardless 
of whether, in each choice, only one doctrine is applicable or both doc-
trines are applicable and one doctrine overrules another. Consider an-
other case of triage in an emergency room. Once again there are three 
injured parties, x, y, and z. Let us say that the injuries are sufficiently 
similar so that if the doctrine of negligence governs who is to receive pri-
ority from the doctor on duty, then he would be free to choose x, y, or z. 
All three options are legal. Now let us say that x and z happen to be hus-
band and wife. The husband (x) dotes on his wife (z) and wants her to be 
This content downloaded from 130.091.146.055 on June 07, 2018 13:33:04 PM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
258 /  T H E  J O U R N A L  O F  L E G A L  S T U D I E S  /  V O L U M E  4 6  ( 2 )  /  J U N E  2 0 1 7
treated ahead of him. Let us say that freedom of contract overrules negli-
gence in the choice between treating the husband or the wife first: the wife 
must be treated ahead of the husband. However, in the choices between 
y and z and between x and y, there is no contract among the parties, and 
therefore negligence doctrine prevails, which means that between them, 
the doctor is free to choose to treat either. This means that, once again, 
CD holds, and the legal system is not an option-stratified system.
There are two ways in which the law can induce cycles. One of them 
is when property (2), CD, holds. That is, both options are legal in the 
choice between x and y and in the choice between y and z, but only one 
option is legal in the choice between x and z. This is the type of law- 
induced cycle that we have focused on up to now. It follows from an in-
teraction between the law and the preferences of the decision maker. The 
other type of law-induced cycle is more direct and occurs when the law 
itself is cyclical, that is, when
   ({ , }) { }, ({ , }) { }, ({ , }) { }.x y x y z y x z z= = =and  (6)
Figure 4 illustrates this option. In this case, the choices of a law- 
abiding citizen are cyclical, regardless of the decision maker’s preferences. 
A law-abiding citizen must follow the law. Thus, if the law is cyclical, 
then the choices of a law-abiding citizen must also be cyclical. Consider 
proposition 1, which addresses the aggregation of conditionally option- 
stratified doctrines. In the proof of proposition 1 (see the Appendix) 
we show that, under unanimity, combined doctrines fail to produce an 
option- stratified legal system because both property (2) and rule (6) can 
occur. Thus, when doctrines are combined, the law can become cyclical 
in some cases, whereas in others cycles result from the interaction of the 
law and the decision maker’s preferences, as in property (2). We now il-
lustrate the case in which combined doctrines make the legal system itself 
cyclical, with suitable variations on the examples above.
Let us return to the triage in the emergency room, but now let us as-
sume that x’s injuries are far more serious than y’s injuries, which are, in 
turn, far more serious than z’s injuries. The negligence doctrine by itself 
constitutes an option-stratified system devoid of cycling problems. Party 
x must be treated ahead of y, who must be treated ahead of z. If, how-
ever, as in our original example, x and z are husband and wife who agree 
that z must be treated ahead of x, then, by freedom of contract, z must be 
treated ahead of x. Hence, if the law is to follow negligence in the choices 
involving person y (where no contract exists) and the principle of free-
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dom of contract (where a legal contract does exist), then we get the cy-
clical law under which x must be treated ahead of y who must be treated 
ahead of z who must be treated ahead of x.
This example is far more general than it might appear at first. One 
way of appreciating its generality is to replace the freedom-of-contract 
doctrine with another doctrine that formally accomplishes the same 
thing. For instance, let us change the facts a little. Let us no longer as-
sume that x and z are husband and wife. Instead, let us assume that x 
attacked z, and the injuries each received are the result of that fight. We 
might now plausibly adopt an equitable-consideration doctrine that ap-
plies comparatively between x and z and gives z priority over x. If we 
assume, as we plausibly might, that the relative priority decreed by the 
negligence doctrine between x and y and between y and z remains un-
touched, the same cycle is generated. Negligence ranks y ahead of z and 
x ahead of y, and equitable consideration does not come into play with 
regard to either pair. It does come into consideration and displaces negli-
gence between x and z, thus producing a cycle.
A more commonplace doctrine to take the place of either freedom of 
contract or the equitable consideration doctrine would be a fiduciary- duty 
doctrine (such as might prevail between a captain and his passenger on 
a ship or between most professionals and their clients), which typically 
prohibits a party from benefiting at the expense of another, even if that is 
cost justified, in the sense that his benefits would exceed the other  party’s 
loss. If we posit that kind of fiduciary relationship between x and z, 
then it would operate in the same way to produce a cycle. In other words, 
negligence allows y to prevail over z and would allow x to prevail over 
y. The fiduciary-duty doctrine, however, would allow z to prevail over x. 
If x is the decision maker, we now have a fairly typical risk- creation sce-
nario in which someone, namely x, has to make a decision that will affect 
other parties and has to choose one among several feasible ways of dis-
Figure 4. Example of cyclical law 
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tributing risks among them. If such a scenario is subject to the negligence 
doctrine and some other doctrine that operates like freedom of contract, 
equitable consideration, or fiduciary-duty doctrine, cycles of just the sort 
the  theorem contemplates are generated.
These examples are all structurally similar to a cycling problem 
long familiar to the law but mistakenly thought to be somewhat exotic, 
namely, the problem of circular priorities that can arise in property law 
and in the law of secured transactions. Owner O first sells his property to 
buyer 1; next he fraudulently sells the same property to buyer 2, and fi-
nally he sells it a third time to buyer 3. In the end, the authorities have to 
decide who among the buyers has priority over whom. They will do so by 
resorting according to several appealing doctrines, each of which taken 
by itself may be an option-stratified doctrine but that in combination no 
longer are. The first doctrine provides that prior purchases prevail over 
subsequent purchases. A second doctrine provides that if a purchaser files 
a record of his purchase in an official record book, he prevails over one 
who did not, and that if both purchasers filed, the first to file prevails. Fi-
nally, a third doctrine provides that if a later purchaser files his purchase 
in the record book, ahead of previous purchasers who did not, but in fact 
has notice of the prior purchase, he loses to the prior purchaser. A cycle 
arises in the case in which buyer 1 buys but does not file, buyer 2 files but 
knows that buyer 1 bought, and buyer 3 buys and files but does not know 
about any of the prior buyers. We refer the reader to Naeh and Segal 
(2009) for examples of intransitivities in the Talmud.
6. RELATIONSHIP TO THE SOCIAL CHOICE LITERATURE
It is only natural to wonder how exactly our theorem relates to social 
choice theory, especially Arrow’s theorem, to which it has some connec-
tion. We here try to spell out some of the connections and differences.
Arrow, social choice theory, and our results deal with intransitivity 
and how it can arise. That is probably the most marked and notable area 
of overlap. But there is also a notable difference in the particular way 
in which intransitivity arises, as well as of course the subject matter to 
which it pertains: collective decision making in social choice theory, and 
legal systems in this paper.
One rough-and-ready way of describing Arrow’s theorem is to say 
that it shows us that if one tries to aggregate the preference orderings of 
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different people, one often gets results that are intransitive, dependent 
on irrelevant alternatives, or peculiar in various other ways. Many of the 
important impossibility results proved in the wake of Arrow’s theorem 
have the same general character. Although our results too are concerned 
with intransitivity, our first main result, the legal cycling theorem, is con-
cerned in a different way than the Arrovian literature. Whereas that liter-
ature starts out with a series of orders as the input, as it were, and shows 
that the output is intransitive, in contrast, we start with something very 
general, a legal system on which we basically impose no restrictions (for 
example, no requirement that it be an order), and then show that if one 
were to impose a single, mild-seeming requirement on it, the prohibition 
on cycling, one ends up with exactly one very peculiar type of legal sys-
tem, what we call an option-stratified system.
Our second main result, the combination theorem, is more directly in 
line with the Arrovian approach because it shows how combining various 
orderly rankings, those imposed by a variety of transitive doctrines, can 
result in an intransitive ranking. Here too, however, there are important 
contrasts, because we dispense with some of the standard assumptions 
relied on to varying degrees in that literature, such as the independence 
of irrelevant alternatives, liberalism, and so on. However, we do make 
use of an assumption resembling the Pareto principle in our combination 
theorem, namely, the assumption that when all pertinent doctrines agree 
with respect to an outcome, that should also be the outcome decreed by 
the legal system (doctrinal unanimity).
The combination theorem does not make use of important assump-
tions such as the independence of irrelevant alternatives. However, this 
result is not stronger than Arrow’s, and it does not imply Arrow’s result. 
Some assumptions in Arrow’s theorem are not needed because a doctrine 
may not be complete (that is, a doctrine can apply only in some issues 
and not in all issues). Thus, the set of all doctrines is large. This limits the 
ways in which doctrines can be successfully aggregated.
It should also prove helpful to relate our result to the legal literature 
that has been inspired by social choice theory. Arrow’s theorem initially 
attracted legal scholars’ attention because it was about collective deci-
sion making, and law is the product of collective decision making by leg-
islatures and by multimember courts. Since Arrow proved that rational 
peoples’ preferences could not be readily aggregated into something re-
sembling a single person with conventionally rational preferences, it was 
recognized that this rendered problematic the laws’ tendency to treat the 
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pronouncements of legislatures and courts as though they reflected the 
coherent intentions of a single person (Spitzer 1979; Easterbrook 1982; 
Kornhauser and Sager 1986).
But this was not the only way in which Arrow-type results were seen 
to be relevant to law. In the second use legal scholars found for social 
choice, they followed the lead of economists and decision theorists who 
understood that Arrow’s insights had implications not only for collec-
tive decision making but for individual decision making, inasmuch as 
it involved the aggregation of multiple criteria that functioned some-
what analogously to the preferences of individual voters. Several schol-
ars, realizing that legal decision making is a kind of multicriterial deci-
sion making, then started to wonder about the implications Arrow-type 
results might have for law, exploring, for instance, the difficulties that 
judges and administrators encounter when they try to devise rules meet-
ing a combination of different desiderata, as they try to aggregate the 
different underlying goals, values, and principles behind these rules in 
acceptable ways (Spitzer 1979; Chapman 2003; Katz 2011; Miller and 
Rachmilevitch 2014). Chapman (2003), in particular, speculates that po-
tential intransitivities lurk behind many legal phenomena and should not 
be viewed as a blemish but as a crucial feature that needs to be explored 
further. (In a related vein, though by a rather different line of argument 
than ours, Temkin [2012] suggests that all moral reasoning routinely vi-
olates transitivity.)
We too are looking at legal decision making as a type of multicriterial 
decision making, although somewhat differently from the way it has been 
done before. We do not start with any goals, principles, or values that 
the legal doctrines in question seek to aggregate. Instead, we simply take 
as given whatever set of doctrines the legal system happens to contain. 
We then impose a simple requirement on the decision making of people 
subject to this system, namely, that it not violate transitivity or ordered 
choice, and we then show that only a very unrealistic, unattractive legal 
system such as has never existed, the option-stratified one, will meet this 
requirement.
There is an additional connection between this paper and social choice 
theory. So far, the preference P is taken to be that of an individual: the 
law-abiding citizen. However, nothing prevents preference P from being 
that of a group or the entire society. Social choice theory often shows 
that social preferences cannot always be ordered. The results in this paper 
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 reveal an additional difficulty. Consider the case in which social prefer-
ences can be expressed by an order (for example, a social welfare func-
tion). Now assume that society’s final choice is the one that maximizes 
the social welfare function among feasible and legal options. Even if, by 
assumption, social preferences are ordered, social choices can be cyclic 
(or, more  generally, be nonordered) if the legal system is not option strat-
ified. In this sense, the difficulty imposed by legal constraints is above and 
beyond the traditional difficulty in social choice.
We offer a brief remark about the relationship of our results to de-
cision theory. A growing literature in decision theory has produced 
models that can accommodate behavioral anomalies. Among many 
contributions, Manzini and Mariotti (2007) consider the process of cat-
egorization, Masatlioglu, Nakajima, and Ozbay (2012) consider models 
of limited attention, and Cherepanov, Feddersen, and Sandroni (2013) 
consider agents with psychological constraints. These models do not con-
sider legal constraints or the impact of the law on decision making. They 
are models of bounded rationality in which the decision maker has some 
cognitive or psychological limitation (for example, cannot pay attention 
to all available choices), while this paper presents a model of full rational-
ity in which the limitation of the decision maker is normatively appealing 
(that is, respect for the law). Finally, the questions addressed in this paper 
(for example, why the law should not be option stratified) have no clear 
counterpart in the decision-theoretic literature. The focus of this paper 
is the characterization of the constraints (that is, the legal systems) that 
induce cycles. In contrast, the decision-theoretic literature is usually inter-
ested in the characterization of the behavior that follows from other types 
of constraints.
7. IMPLICATIONS
As we have shown, cycles are not necessarily the result of irrationality but 
may simply follow from the fact that plausible legal regimes are not op-
tion stratified. This new perspective on cycles makes it natural to revisit 
fundamental results obtained when cycles are ruled out. Here we focus 
on Sen’s liberal paradox and Kaplow and Shavell’s antifairness argument 
(see Sen 1970; Kaplow and Shavell 2002).
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7.1. Sen’s Liberal Paradox
The so-called liberal paradox in Sen (1970) reveals a conflict between a 
legal system’s granting its citizens rights of an even rudimentary nature 
and respecting the Pareto principle. If the system grants rights and if it 
respects the Pareto principle, it gives rise to a cycle. Sen’s claim has often 
been attacked on the ground that he had an implausible, eccentric con-
ception of rights. We do not believe that criticism is valid, and there is no 
reason for us to address it here. Instead, we note that our result casts the 
implications of Sen’s result in a rather different light. His result suggests 
that, under transitivity, we must choose between rights and the Pareto 
principle. Now, a commitment to both rights and the Pareto principle can 
lead to cycles just as the combination of two or more doctrines can pro-
duce non-option-stratified systems and non-option-stratified systems can 
induce cycles. However inasmuch as all plausible legal regimes produce 
such cycles, and live with them, we can say the same thing about Sen’s 
situation. We may be able to have both elementary rights and the Pareto 
principle despite the fact that they lead to a cycle. The existence of a cycle 
in and of itself does not seem a compelling reason to rule either of them 
out of bounds or to force a choice between them.
7.2. Kaplow and Shavell on Fairness versus Welfare
Kaplow and Shavell (2002) show that if one combines the Pareto princi-
ple with any kind of fairness-based principles, that will produce a  cycle. 
They therefore argue that fairness-based legal principles should be re-
jected. However, in our model, if any two doctrines are combined, that 
can lead to a cycle. So if the Pareto principle is combined with just about 
any doctrine, that can produce a cycle. Thus, our result casts a differ-
ent light on that implication in much the same way that it does with re-
spect to Sen’s. We can say about Kaplow and Shavell’s result what we say 
about Sen’s result, simply replacing rights with fairness-based  principles: 
inasmuch as all plausible legal regimes produce cycles, and live with 
them, the existence of a cycle in and of itself does not seem a compelling 
reason to rule the choices that give rise to them out-of-bounds. That is 
not to say that the intransitivity is never a problem. It is just that tran-
sitivity cannot be taken for granted. There would seem to be reasonable 
and unreasonable forms of intransitivity, and the challenging question in 
each case in which the specter of intransitivity rears its head is to find out 
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which it is. That is something that remains to be explored in connection 
both with Sen (1970) and Kaplow and Shavell (2002).
Our argument that cycles are inevitable does not, however, mean that 
there are no legitimate concerns with cycles. It is generally understood 
that where there is cycling, there are ample opportunities for strategic 
behavior—for manipulation. This is most familiar in the voting context, 
in which control of the agenda, and especially the sequence in which cer-
tain issues are voted on, can greatly influence the outcome. Cycling in the 
legal context would seem to harbor those same possibilities. It is part of 
our research agenda to explore the various strategic opportunities pro-
duced by cycling in law. In a future paper, we will show that, just like in 
the voting context, cycles induced by law give law-abiding citizens oppor-
tunities to game the law. Hence, as a corollary of the results in this paper, 
the opportunities to manipulate the law are also ineradicable.
The analysis of legal strategizing produced by cycles is beyond the 
scope of this paper. So we will simply draw the reader’s attention to the 
most immediately obvious one: by manipulating the order in which cer-
tain choices are made, a great deal of what might look like circumvention 
of rules is made unavoidable. We know that in any cycle, it should be 
possible to end up where you want to end up, regardless of where you 
start, so long as you make the right sequence of choices. Let us illustrate 
that with an artificial, but nonetheless illuminating, example using the 
duress situation described above.
The original version of the duress example involved a defendant who 
is threatened with something very painful unless he helps the people who 
have made the threat commit some crime, for which he can validly claim 
the defense of duress. By contrast, we noted, if he had been threatened 
with the destruction of a treasured manuscript he has labored over for 
many years, and if, to avert the manuscript’s destruction, he had assisted 
them in their planned crime, he would not qualify for the defense. This 
gave rise to a cycle because the defendant is allowed to choose to endure 
great pain in exchange for protecting his manuscript, he is allowed to 
commit a serious crime to avoid being subjected to the painful treatment, 
but he is not allowed to commit the crime to prevent his manuscript from 
being destroyed. Here is how he might exploit this intransitivity strategi-
cally: Suppose the defendant is determined to do the equivalent of saving 
his manuscript by committing a crime. He pays off the people who are 
seeking to recruit him for a crime with money that he borrows from a 
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loan shark. This loan shark in turn demands that he commit a serious 
crime as a way of extinguishing his debt, which he cannot pay. But if he 
commits a crime to escape the loan shark’s threats, he would most likely 
qualify for the defense of duress, because at this point he commits the 
crime not to protect his manuscript but to avert great physical harm.
The example is, of course, contrived, but the contrivance is the sort 
that is bound to have more realistic counterparts. Wherever there is in-
transitivity, there is an opportunity, at least if the context is even mildly 
propitious, for strategic exploitation of this sort. The full scope of such 
opportunities, including the exploitation of menu effects and related phe-
nomena, we plan to explore in another paper.
7.3. Some Implications for Economics
Transitivity is a central tenet in economics. Thus, basic economic prin-
ciples must be revisited if legal restrictions are to be taken into account. 
Consider, for example, revealed-preference theory. An elementary idea 
is that if x is chosen over y, and y is chosen over z, then x must be pre-
ferred to z. This holds if there are no legal restrictions but may not hold 
otherwise. It is known exactly how to infer preference from choice when 
the law is not taken into consideration but not when there are legal re-
strictions. The full characterization of how to infer the preferences of the 
law-abiding citizen from his choices is motivated by the results of this pa-
per but is left for future work.
This special case of revealed-preference theory is, however, just an ex-
ample of the type of restructuring economics would need to undertake 
to properly accommodate legal restrictions. In this paper, we limited 
the analysis to decision under certainty. Under uncertainty, the decision 
maker in economics is typically assumed to satisfy additional axioms (the 
axiomatic structure of Savage and of von Neumann and Morgenstern 
being the most prominent examples). These are the building blocks on 
which much of rational choice theory rests. But just as transitivity may 
no longer hold when the law is taken into account, other basic principles 
(for example, monotonicity) may also not hold under legal constraints. 
Hence, the axiomatic structure of the law-abiding citizen both under cer-
tainty and under uncertainty may be quite distinct from the traditional 
axiomatic structures that ignore the law. The development of these new 
axiomatic foundations that would fully integrate law and economics is 
also beyond the scope of this paper but can be motivated by our results.
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8. A LINGERING QUESTION: CONTEXT-DEPENDENT ALTERNATIVES
There is a question that repeatedly arises when certain choices are de-
scribed as intransitive. In closely looking at a given case of intransitivity, 
one starts to wonder whether the intransitivity might not be spurious, 
whether it could not be made to go away if we are only careful enough 
about describing the alternatives before us.
Consider again our case of self-defense. We imagined a decision maker 
who is willing to incur serious injury to protect a manuscript from great 
harm. We also noted that the law of self-defense will allow him to protect 
his body from great harm by using deadly force but will not allow him to 
do so to protect his manuscript from destruction. This meant that when 
choosing between inflicting deadly harm on someone or suffering great 
harm himself, he will find himself choosing the former; that when choos-
ing between suffering great harm to himself or to his manuscript, he will 
once again find himself choosing the former; but that when choosing be-
tween inflicting great harm on someone else or suffering great harm to his 
manuscript, he will choose the latter, which thus results in a cycle. What 
if one were to distinguish between inflicting great harm on another for 
the sake of protecting one’s manuscript and inflicting great harm on an-
other for the sake of protecting one’s body, in other words, if one were to 
distinguish between inflicting great harm on another legally and inflicting 
such harm illegally? Having thus split what appears to be a single alter-
native into two, has not the intransitivity now been made to disappear? 
Something analogous could be tried with every one of our examples.
There are several difficulties with this approach. The most immedi-
ate worry is the one we noted before, namely, that it proves too much. 
We have here a strategy that could be used to make all intransitivities go 
away, that is to say, not only in our examples but in all cases. But do we 
really want to deny the possibility of intransitivity altogether?
A difficulty that goes more to the heart of the matter, however, is one 
that surfaced when this possibility was first explored in the early days of 
decision theory. What became clear rather quickly, then, was that if one 
does not insist that alternatives be independent of their context—inde-
pendent, that is, of the other alternatives in the choice set—various kinds 
of unpalatable logical consequences start to abound. In other words, 
the meaning of an option x cannot be allowed to change depending on 
whether y or z is also available. This assumption is implicit in almost 
every formal model and in this one as well. As we now show, if this as-
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sumption is relaxed, then the decision maker cannot order all alternatives 
because some choices would be impossible to make.
To see this, recall that an order is a complete, transitive binary rela-
tion. These are the two traditional pillars of rationality. That is, com-
pleteness and transitivity are often equated with rationality (see Mas-
Colell, Whinston, and Green 1995, ch. 1, definition 1.B.1). Completeness 
requires some decision to be possible between any two alternatives. 
Now, for concreteness consider option x (to use deadly force) in our self- 
defense example in Section 3.3. Let us split option x into two new al-
ternatives: xl and xi. Option xl is to use deadly force legally (that is, in 
legitimate self-defense). Option xi is to use deadly force illegally. In this 
example, the use of deadly force is legal if the alternative is to incur a se-
rious injury (y) but not if it is to have the manuscript damaged (z). Thus, 
it is impossible to make a choice between xl and z. It is also impossible 
to make a choice between xi and y for the same reason. If z is the avail-
able alternative, then the use of deadly force is illegal. Hence, one cannot 
make a choice between xl and z because xl does not exist in the presence 
of z. Naturally, this is a general phenomenon that does not hinge on the 
specific example concerning self-defense. If an option ceases to exist in 
the presence of another option, then completeness no longer holds; there-
fore, the logical structure of the choice function is not as in an order, and, 
hence, it is fundamentally different from the ones in traditional choice 
theory that abstract away from legal constraints. This limitation, how-
ever, does not apply to context-independent contingencies. For example, 
taking an umbrella if it rains is context independent because whether it 
rains does not depend on the available alternatives. Context-dependent 
contingencies (such as legality), on the other hand, make choices incom-
patible with orders. Thus, our broad claim that legal constraints lead to 
choices incompatible with orders still holds even under the extremely un-
usual approach of allowing for such contingencies.
Finally, there is a very practical difficulty with this approach to intran-
sitivity. Intransitivities are worrisome because they open us up to exploit-
ative actions. In law, the most important kind of opportunity is the pos-
sibility of getting to a forbidden end by choosing an indirect path, such 
as the one we described in connection with our duress example: some-
one unable to protect his manuscript by participating in a crime arranged 
matters so that he could indirectly achieve that very trade-off by making 
use of the intransitivity. For each of our examples, such an arbitrage-like 
strategy could be constructed. Consider again the case of necessity, in 
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which a cycle results from the fact that the decision maker is permitted 
to break into a cabin once he is stranded without a safe means of descent 
but not if he can simply abstain from the climb. The intransitivity allows 
him to first climb the mountain and then break into the cabin rather than 
first break into the cabin and then climb the mountain. Such arbitrage 
opportunities are the practical manifestations of the presence of a genuine 
intransitivity and cannot be made to go away by the conceptual magic of 
splitting a single alternative into two different context-dependent alterna-
tives.
9. CONCLUSION
A legal system is option stratified if it is possible to rank order all legal 
options a citizen might face and if the system requires that he choose the 
highest-ranked alternative among the options available to him. We show 
that an option-stratified system is the only one that can avoid cycling. 
We then show, through suitably representative examples and one general 
proposition, why no acceptable legal system is going to be option strati-
fied and why all acceptable systems are therefore bound to induce cycles. 
Several implications of this result remain to be explored.
APPENDIX: PROOFS OF THE CYCLING AND COMBINATION THEORIES
A1. Choices with More than Two Options
Here we extend our main results to choices with two or more options. So let an 
issue B now be a subset of A with two or more elements, all of which are different 
from each other. Unless otherwise stated, other definitions from the paper remain 
valid. Thus, a legal system is still a mapping  :  →   A such that ∅ ≠ (B) Í 
B. However, to differentiate the case of binary choice from the general case, we refer 
to  as a full legal system if choices are not necessarily binary. The definition of 
what it means for a full legal system to be option stratified is a direct extension of 
our previous definition.
Definition A1. A full legal system  is option stratified if there is a utility 
function u : A →  such that for every issue B,
 x B u x u y y BÎ Û ³ Î ( ) ( ) ( ) .for every  
As before, a full legal system is option stratified if there is a function that ranks 
all theoretically possible alternatives and deems legal the top ones and only the 
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top ones. Note that a full legal system can be non–option stratified even though, 
when restricted to binary choices, it is option stratified. Consider three alterna-
tives x, y, and z and a full legal system  such that
    ( , ) ( , ), ( , ) ( , ), ( , ) ( , ), ( , , ) ( ).x y x y y z y z x z x z x y z x= = = =and  
Restricted to binary choices, the legal system (x, y) = (x, y), (y, z) = (y, z), 
and (x, z) = (x, z) is option stratified. This follows because in binary choices, all 
choices are legal, and for a utility function that ranks x, y, and z equally, all op-
tions are optimal. However, the full legal system is not option stratified because 
(x, y, z) = (x) implies that x must be ranked strictly above y and z, whereas the 
combination of (x, y) = (x, y) and (x, z) = (x, z) implies that x must be ranked 
equally with y and z.
If choices may involve more than two options, there are different types of be-
havior that are inconsistent with the choices of a rational agent subject to phys-
ical constraints. This type of behavior is known as the weak axiom of revealed- 
preference (WARP) violation. We state this formally in definition A2.
Definition A2. A choice function C violates WARP if there are two issues B 
and B* such that
 B B C B B C B C BÍ Î ¹*, ( *) , ( ) ( *).and  
A violation of WARP occurs when the choice C(B*) in the superset B* is in the 
subset B but it is not chosen. A cycle implies a WARP violation because if C({x, y}) 
= x, C({y, z}) = y, and C({x, z}) = z, then no matter which choice is made on the 
issue {x, y, z}, there is a WARP violation. A choice function such as
 C x y x C y z y C x z x C x y z y({ , }) , ({ , }) , ({ , }) , ({ , , })= = = =and  
is not necessarily cyclical, but it violates WARP because y is rejected against x in 
the binary choice but y is chosen over x in the choice between x, y, and z. When-
ever the choices violate WARP, they cannot be ordered because x is chosen over y 
in some issue, and y is chosen over x in another issue.
Definition A3. A full legal system  induces WARP violations if there exists 
a preference P such that the resulting choice function of a law-abiding citizen CP, 
violates WARP.
We also speak of a legal system inducing WARP violations. We do this because 
if there were no law, there would be no violations of WARP (Samuelson 1938).
Theorem A1: Extended Legal Cycling. Consider the case in which there are at 
least three distinct alternatives. Then (a) no full legal system that is option strati-
fied induces WARP violations. However, (b) any full legal system that is not op-
tion stratified induces WARP violations.
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The extended legal cycling theorem characterizes all legal systems that induce 
WARP violations. It is the counterpart of the legal cycling theorem when choices 
involve two or more alternatives. The combination theorem is an impossibility re-
sult that holds in the case of binary choice, and, therefore, it also holds in the case 
of choices involving two or more options.
What exactly this theorem means, and what it adds to the original legal cycling 
theorem, will become clearer with the help of an (admittedly artificial) example. 
Let us return to a situation of triage in which we have three patients. Al, Bea, and 
Chloe are competing for some scarce medical resource. It could be the emergency 
room doctor’s attention or a transplant organ or some medical equipment. Per-
haps the most realistic version of what we have in mind would be the Seattle God 
Committee, which in the early days of dialysis had to decide which patients would 
have access to scarce dialysis slots. Let us suppose that the decision maker uses a 
rule that works as follows: All patients are rated on three scales—the severity of 
their injury, the benefit they are likely to derive from treatment, and miscellaneous 
equitable factors that argue in their favor. All patients under consideration for the 
one and only treatment opportunity during a particular period are then ranked on 
each of these relevant factors, and the patient who has the largest number of fac-
tors in his favor gets treated during that particular period. If it is a tie, the doctor 
decides according to his own preferences or by lot.
Now let us suppose that if we were to rank Al, Bea, and Chloe on each of these 
factors, we would obtain the following result:
Severity. Bea, Al, Chloe
Benefit. Chloe, Al, Bea
Equity. Al, Bea, Chloe
If the only choices the decision maker might end up facing are binary, because it 
only ever happens that two patients present themselves at one time, the rule we 
have translates into something resembling a majority voting system: whoever has 
the support of two or more factors prevails. The only relevant theorem would 
then be our legal cycling theorem, which tells us that unless this system is option 
stratified, it will be prone to cycles. That is indeed the case, since we know that 
majority voting, to which this is equivalent, can result in cycling. In this case, 
however, no such cycle results because of the way in which the three patients hap-
pen to be ranked. If Al and Bea were to have their claims to treatment evaluated, 
Al would win (there being two factors in his favor). If Bea and Chloe were to have 
their claims compared, Bea would win (there being two factors in her favor). If Al 
and Chloe were to be compared, Al would win, and thus everything here is nicely 
transitive. There is no real surprise there: cycles occur only under certain circum-
stances. Can we therefore breathe a sigh of relief and conclude that at least when 
the three patients are ranked as they are, the legal system will not produce any 
odd results? The extended legal cycling theorem tells us that there is still some-
thing to worry about. We can see what it is if we consider the possibility that all 
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three patients present themselves for treatment simultaneously. Now we have a 
tie, since each patient has exactly one factor on which he or she ranks first. The 
significance of that fact is that the rule we have in place, although it is not generat-
ing a cycle in this case, does violate WARP.
Formally, we have the following: let x be treat Al first, y be treat Bea first, and 
z be treat Chloe first. Then, in this example,
    ({ , }) , ({ , }) , ({ , }) , ({ , , }) ( , , ).x y x y z y x z x x y z x y z= = = =and  
So if the doctor prefers to treat Bea first (perhaps because of a preference for se-
verity over benefit and equity), for example, if, say, y P z P x and the doctor is law 
abiding, then the doctor’s choices are
 C x y x C y z y C x z x C x y z y({ , }) , ({ , }) , ({ , }) , ({ , , }) ;= = = =and  
the choices thus violate WARP but are not cyclic. In the same way, if the doctor 
prefers to treat Chloe first, for example, if, say, z P y P x and the doctor is law 
abiding, then the doctor’s choices are noncyclic but violate WARP, albeit in a dif-
ferent way. The choices now are
 C x y x C y z y C x z x C x y z z({ , }) , ({ , }) , ({ , }) , ({ , , }) ,= = = =and  
and so z is chosen over x and y, although z is rejected against x, and z is rejected 
against y.
This is a disturbing possibility, since it opens up opportunities for extensive 
manipulation just as cycling does. Someone could try to influence the choice 
simply by temporarily injecting a third alternative into the choice set. It seems a 
strange and disturbing property of legal systems. In the first example, one could 
reverse the choice between x and y by adding z as an option. In the second exam-
ple, one could reverse the choice between x and z by adding y as an option. Any 
violation of WARP, whether or not it is a cycle, makes the choices nonordered 
and, hence, vulnerable to manipulation.
We can prevent this from happening only by turning the legal system into one 
that is option stratified (and therefore faces all the now familiar difficulties of 
option- stratified systems). That is what the extended legal cycling theorem tells us.
Put differently, in legal systems that allow not merely binary choices (which all 
known systems of course do), there looms an additional possibility that is almost 
as disturbing as cycling: the violation of the WARP condition. If one wants to ex-
clude this disturbing feature, along with cycling, the only way to do it is to switch 
to an option-stratified system.
So far, we have not allowed the law-abiding citizen to be indifferent between 
options. In this section, we present a counterpart of the legal cycling theorem that 
holds even if indifference is allowed. As before we make changes in some, but not 
all, definitions.
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Here a preference P is a complete, transitive binary relation (that is, an order). 
So P may or may not be asymmetric. In principle, there may exist two distinct al-
ternatives x and y, x ≠ y, such that x P y and y P x. This is the case of indifference 
between x and y. Indifference makes it possible for more than one option to be 
optimal and, therefore, for more than one option to be selected. A choice corre-
spondence C is a mapping C :  →   A such that C(B) Í B. The law-abiding- 
citizen’s choice correspondence C (=CP,) is such that CP,(B) Í (B), and if y ∈ 
(B) and y ≠ CP,(B), then CP,(B) P y. Hence, as before, CP,(B) optimizes P on 
(B). However, CP,(B) may contain more than one option. These are the (perhaps 
multiple) options that the law-abiding citizen prefers among the legal ones. Con-
sider the following example: a preference P* is indifferent between x, y, and z. As-
sume no law, and so *(B) = B for every issue B. Then, C CP*( )*, *=   is such that
 C x y x y C y z y z C x z x z*({ , }) { , }, *({ , }) { , }, *({ , }) { , }.= = =and  
Then a choice correspondence in which all options are selected is permitted, even 
in the case of a standard economic agent that optimizes a preference P on B.
Now consider the choice correspondence C:
 C x y x C y z y z C x z x z({ , }) { }, ({ , }) { , }, ({ , }) { , }.= = =and  
This choice correspondence is not possible for a standard economic agent. In the 
absence of any legal restriction, C x y x({ , }) { }=  implies a strict preference for x 
over y, while the combination C y z y z({ , }) { , }=  and C x z x z({ , }) { , }=  implies 
indifference between x, y, and z. This is an example of a choice correspondence 
that we refer to as nonspuriously cyclical. We state this more generally in defini-
tion A4.
Definition A4. A choice correspondence C is nonspuriously cyclical if there 
exist three distinct alternatives x, y, and z such that
 C x y x y C y z z C x z({ , }) { }, ({ , }), ({ , }).= Î Îand  
Nonspuriously cyclical choice correspondences are those that may induce cycles 
and cannot be produced by optimal choice when there is no law.3 Naturally, to be 
nonspuriously cyclical is a property of the choice correspondence itself. It is not a 
property of the final selection that might be made among optimal options.
Definition A5. A legal system  induces nonspurious cyclical choice corre-
spondences if there exists a preference P such that the resulting choice correspon-
dence CP, of a law-abiding citizen is nonspuriously cyclical.
We again speak of a legal system inducing nonspurious cyclic choice corre-
spondences. We do this because they are not possible if there is no law and all 
options are legal.
3. See Suzumura (1983) for related concepts, albeit with different terminology.
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Theorem A2: Legal Cycling (with Possible Indifferences). Consider the case 
in which issues are binary choices and there are at least three distinct alternatives. 
Then, (a) no option-stratified legal system induces nonspurious cyclic choice cor-
respondences. However, (b) any legal system that is not option stratified induces 
nonspurious cyclic choice correspondences.
The legal cycling theorem (with possible indifferences) characterizes the legal 
systems that induce nonspurious cyclic choice correspondences. In this variation 
of the legal cycling theorem, the law-abiding citizen may be indifferent between 
options. In the combination theorem, the law itself might be cyclic (that is, rule 
[6] holds). Then the choices of a law-abiding citizen are cyclic regardless of pref-
erences. In particular, it does not matter whether the law-abiding citizen may or 
may not be indifferent between options.
Finally, the legal cycling theorem can also be modified to accommodate indif-
ference and choices involving two or more options. Cycles must, however, be re-
placed with the more general condition regarding WARP violations.
Definition A6. A choice correspondence C nonspuriously violates WARP if 
there exist two issues B and B* and an option y such that
 B B y C B B y C BÍ Î Ï*, ( *) , ( ). and  
This definition is the counterpart of WARP violations for correspondences. 
Any choice function that violates WARP is also a choice correspondence that non-
spuriously violates WARP.
Definition A7. A full legal system  induces choice correspondences that 
nonspuriously violate WARP if there exists a preference P such that the resulting 
choice correspondence of a law-abiding citizen CP, nonspuriously violates WARP. 
That is, consider a full legal system that induces choice correspondences that 
nonspuriously violate WARP. They produce choice correspondences that do not 
arise in the absence of law.
Theorem A3: Extended Legal Cycling (with Possible Indifferences). Consider 
the case in which there are at least three distinct alternatives. Then no full legal 
system that is option stratified induces choice correspondences that nonspuriously 
violate WARP. However, any full legal system that is not option stratified induces 
choice correspondences that nonspuriously violate WARP.
This result shows that even if the law-abiding citizen may be indifferent be-
tween options, the types of choice correspondences that may occur in the absence 
of any law (that is, by standard economic agents) are the ones that arise under 
option- stratified full legal systems and only under them. If the full legal system is 
not option stratified, it induces correspondences with a logical structure that do 
not arise in the absence of law.
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A2. Proof of the Legal Cycling Theorem (and Related Results)
First consider the basic case in which issues are binary choices and preferences are 
asymmetrical orders. That is, we first demonstrate the legal cycling theorem.
A2.1. Proof of the Legal Cycling Theorem. Assume that  is an option-stratified le-
gal system. Also assume, by contradiction, that there is an asymmetric preference 
order P such that, for the resulting choice function C (=CP, ), there are distinct 
alternatives x, y, and z such that C({x, y}) = x, C({y, z}) = y, and C({x, z}) = z. 
Then x ∈ ({x, y}), y ∈ ({y, z}), and z ∈ ({x, z}). So u(x) ≥ u(y) ≥ u(z) ≥ u(x). 
Thus, u(x) = u(y) = u(z). It now follows that ({x, y}) = {x, y}, ({y, z}) = {y, z}, 
and ({x, z}) = {x, z}. Thus, x P y and y P z and z P x, which is a contradiction 
(with the transitivity of P).
Now for the converse. Assume, by contradiction, that  is a legal system that 
is not option stratified, and, for no asymmetric preference order P, the resulting 
choice function C (=CP, ) is cyclical.
Step 1. There cannot be three distinct options x, y, and z such that for two 
different pairs of options, say {x, y} and {y, z}, the law allows both choices, for 
example, ({x, y}) = {x, y} and ({y, z}) = {y, z}, and for the remaining pair {x, z}, 
({x, z}) has only one element. Assume that ({x, z}) = {z}. Consider any asym-
metric preference order such that x P y P z. Then C({x, y}) = x, C({y, z}) = y, and 
C({x, z}) = z. Now assume that ({x, z}) = {x}. Consider any asymmetric prefer-
ence order such that z P y P x. Then C({z, y}) = z, C({y, x}) = y, and C({x, z}) = x. 
Let ≻ be the binary relation defined by x ≻ y ⇔ ({x, y}) = {x}.
Step 2. The relation ≻ is transitive. Assume that x ≻ y ≻ z. If ({x, z}) = 
{z}, then, for any preference P, the choices of a law-abiding citizen are cyclical 
(because the law requires x to be chosen over y, y over z, and z over x). If ({x, 
z}) = {x, z}, then consider any asymmetric preference order P such that z P x; the 
choices of a law-abiding citizen are cyclical. Thus, x ≻ z.
Let the chain S be a sequence of options xn, . . . , x1 such that xj ≻ xi if j > i. 
Such a chain must exist; otherwise, all options are legal, and so  is an option- 
stratified legal system. Moreover, given that A is finite, there must exist a longest 
chain (one for which the number of elements in it is maximal). With some abuse 
of notation, let S = [xn, . . . , x1] be a longest, not necessarily unique chain. By 
definition, there is no option x such that x ≻ xn and no option y such that x1 ≻ y.
Step 3. For any alternative y that does not belong to the chain S, there exists a 
unique element xi ∈ S such that ({y, xi}) = {y, xi}. Assume that there are two dis-
tinct elements xi ∈ S and xj ∈ S such that ({y, xi}) = {y, xi} and ({y, xj}) = {y, xj}. 
By definition, ({xi , xj}) has only one element. This contradicts step 1. Now assume 
that for some alternative y, there is no element xi in chain S such that ({y, xi}) = 
{y, xi}. Thus, xn ≻ y and y ≻ x1. The chain S must contain more than two options; 
otherwise, the chain xn ≻ y ≻ x1 is longer. Moreover, for any i = 2, . . . , n, if xi ≻ 
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y, then xi-1 ≻ y. Otherwise, xi ≻ y ≻ xi-1, and so the chain xn ≻ . . . xi ≻ y ≻ xi-1 ≻ 
. . . ≻ x1 is longer. It follows that either x1 ≻ y or y ≻ xn, which is a contradiction.
Given any alternative y not in the chain S, let i(y) ∈ {1, . . . , n} be such that 
({y, xi(y)}) = {y, xi(y)}. If z is in the chain S, let i(z) ∈ {1, . . . , n} be such that z = 
xi(z). For any alternative x, let u(x) = i(x). By step 3, u is well defined.
Step 4. If an option y is not in the chain S, then ({y, xj}) = {y} if j < i(y), and 
({y, xj}) = {xj} if j > i(y).The case ({y, xj}) = {y, xj} can be ruled out by step 1 
because ({xj, xi(y)}) has only one element, and, by definition, ({y, xi(y)}) = {y, xi(y)}. 
Let xi = xi(y). Assume that j < i(y). Then C({xi , xj}) = xi. Consider any asymmetric 
order P such that y P xi. Then C({xi , y}) = y. If ({y, xj}) = {xj}, then C({y, xj}) = 
{xj}. This forms a cycle. So ({y, xj}) = {y}. Now assume that j > i. Then C({xi , xj}) 
= xj. Consider any order P such that xi P y. Then C({xi , y}) = xi. If ({y, xj}) = {y}, 
then C(y, xj) = y. This forms a cycle. So ({y, xj}) = xj.
Step 5. If z and y are distinct options and neither is in S, then ({y, z}) = z 
if i(y) < i(z), ({y, z}) = y if i(y) > i(z), and ({y, z}) = {y, z} if i(y) = i(z). Con-
sider the case i(y) < i(z). By step 4, ({z, xi(y)}) = z. By definition, ({y, xi(y)}) = {y, 
xi(y)}. By step 1, the case ({y, z}) = (y, z) can be ruled out. Now consider the case 
({y, z}) = y. Then C({y, z}) = y. Given that ({z, xi(y)}) = z, then C({z, xi(y)}) = z. 
Now consider any order P such that y P xi(y). By definition, ({y, xi(y)}) = {y, xi(y)}. 
So C({y, xi(y)}) = y. This forms a cycle. Thus, ({y, z}) = z. The proof of the case 
i(y) > i(z) is the same with just a change in labels; hence, it is omitted. Now con-
sider the case i(y) = i(z). Let xi = xi(z) = xi(y). By definition, ({y, xi}) = {y, xi}, and 
({z, xi}) = {z, xi}. So, by step 1, ({y, z}) = {y, z}.
The proof is now concluded as follows: Let x and y be the distinct options. If 
both of them belong to the chain S, then, by definition, u(x) ≠ u(y), and ({x, y}) 
= x if u(x) > u(y). If one of them, say x, belongs to the chain S, and the other, y, 
does not, then, by step 4, ({x, y}) = x if u(x) > u(y) and ({x, y}) = y if u(y) > 
u(x). By definition, ({x, y}) = {x, y} if u(y) = u(x). If both x and y do not belong 
to S, then, by step 5, ({x, y}) = {x} if u(x) > u(y), ({x, y}) = {y} if u(y) > u(x), 
and ({x, y}) = {x, y} if u(y) = u(x). Therefore,  is an option-stratified system, 
which is a contradiction. This demonstrates the legal cycling theorem.
A2.2. Proof of the Extended Legal Cycling Theorem. Now we consider the general 
case in which issues can have two or more alternatives. So we now demonstrate 
the extended legal cycling theorem.
Assume that  is a full option-stratified legal system. Also assume, by contra-
diction, that there is an asymmetric preference order P such that, for the resulting 
choice function C (=CP,), there are issues B and B* such that B Í B*, C(B*) ∈ B, 
and C(B) ≠ C(B*). Then u[C(B)] ≥ u[C(B*)] (because C(B*) ∈ B), and u[C(B*)] 
≥ u[C(B)] (because C(B) ∈ B*). Thus, u[C(B)] = u[C(B*)]. Therefore, C(B) ∈ 
(B*) and C(B*) ∈ (B). It follows that C(B) P C(B*) and C(B*) P C(B), which 
is a contradiction.
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Now for the converse. Assume, by contradiction, that  is a full legal system 
that is not option stratified, and, for no asymmetric preference order P, the result-
ing choice function C (=CP,) violates WARP. Then, in particular, no resulting 
choice function C is cyclical. Hence, by the argument above, the utility function u 
is well defined such that ({x, y}) = {x, y} if u(x) = u(y), and ({x, y}) = {x} if u(x) 
> u(y). Now assume that x ∈ (B) and u(y) > u(x) for some y ∈ B. Then ({x, 
y}) = y. Let P be any preference order such that x P z for any z ≠ x. Then C(B) 
= x, and C(x, y) = y. Thus, C violates WARP, which is a contradiction. Now as-
sume that u(x) ≥ u(y) for every y ∈ B, and x Ï (B). Then C(B) ≠ x, and u(x) ≥ 
u[C(B)]. Let z = C(B). So x ∈ ({z, x}). Let P be any asymmetric preference order 
such that x P z. Then x = C(x, z), x ∈ B, and z = C(B) ≠ x. Thus, C violates 
WARP, which is a contradiction.
A2.3. Proof of the Legal Cycling Theorem (with Possible Indifferences). Assume that 
 is an option-stratified legal system. Also assume, by contradiction, that there is a 
preference order P such that, for the resulting choice function C (=CP,) there are 
distinct alternatives x, y, and z such that
 C x y x y C y z z C x z({ , }) { }, ({ , }), ({ , }).= Î Îand  
Then x ∈ ({x, y}), y ∈ ({y, z}), and z ∈ ({x, z}). So u(x) ≥ u(y) ≥ u(z) ≥ u(x). 
Thus, u(x) = u(y) = u(z). It now follows that ({x, y}) = {x, y}, ({y, z}) = {y, z}, 
and ({x, z}) = {x, z}. Thus, x P y, y P z, and z P x. By transitivity, x P y and y P x. 
Therefore, C({x, y}) = {x, y}, which is a contradiction.
For the converse, if  is a not an option-stratified legal system, then there is a 
preference order (asymmetric) P such that the resulting choice function C (=CP,) 
is cyclic. Therefore, C({x, y}) = x, C({y, z}) = y, and C({x, z}) = z. It follows that 
C is nonspuriously cyclic.
A2.4. Proof of the Extended Legal Cycling Theorem (with Possible Indifferences). As-
sume that  is a full option-stratified legal system. Also assume, by contradiction, 
that there is a preference order P such that, for the resulting choice function C 
(=CP,), there are issues B and B* and an option y such that
 B B y C B B y C BÍ Î Ï*, ( *) , ( ). and  
Let z ∈ (B). Then u(z) ≥ u(y) (because y ∈ B), and u(y) ≥ u(z) (because y ∈ (B*) 
and z ∈ B* (given that B* Ê B Ê (B)). Thus, u(y) = u(z). Therefore, z ∈ (B*). 
It follows that y P z. This holds for any z ∈ (B). Hence, y ∈ C(B), which is a 
contradiction.
For the converse, if  is a full legal system that is not option stratified, then 
there is a preference order (asymmetric) P such that the resulting choice function 
C (=CP, ) violates WARP. Thus, C nonspuriously violates WARP.
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A3. Proof of Proposition 1
First consider the case n = 2. Let x, y, and z be three different choices. Let u1 : A 
→  be any function such as u1(y) = u1(z) > u1(x). Let u2 : A →  be a function 
such as u2(y) = u2(z) > u2(x). Let D1 be any doctrine such that
 D D D1 1 1({ , }) { , }, ({ , }) ({ , }) { },y z y z x y x z z= = =n/a, and  
and for any other issue B = {w, v} where w Ï {x, y, z}, v Ï {x, y, z}, or neither w 
nor v belong to {x, y, z},
 either n/a or ifD D1 1 1 1({ , }) ({ , }) { , } ( ) ( ),w v w v w v u w u v= = =  
 either n/a or ifD D1 1 1 1({ , }) ({ , }) { } ( ) ( ),w v w v w u w u v= = >  
and
 either n/a or ifD D1 1 1 1({ , }) ({ , }) { } ( ) ( ).w v w v v u v u w= = >  
Let D2 be any doctrine such that
 D D D2 2 2( , ) ( , ), ( , ) ( , ), ( , )y z y z x y x y x z= = =and n/a,  
and for any other issue B = {w, v}, where w Ï {x, y, z}, v Ï {x, y, z}, or neither w 
nor v belong to {x, y, z},
 either n/a or ifD D2 2 2 2({ , }) ({ , }) { , } ( ) ( ),w v w v w v u w u v= = =  
 either n/a or ifD D2 2 2 2({ , }) ({ , }) { } ( ) ( ),w v w v w u w u v= = >  
and
 either n/a or ifD D2 2 2 2({ , }) ( , ) { } ( ) ( ).w v w v v u v u w= = >  
By construction, D1 and D2 are conditional option-stratified doctrines. Let α be an 
aggregator that maps conditional option-stratified doctrines into option-stratified 
legal systems, and  = α(D1, D2). By unanimity,
   ({ , }) { , }, ({ , }) { , }, ({ , }) { }.y z y z x y x y x z z= = =and  
Thus,  is not option stratified, which is a contradiction.
The case n > 2 can be shown in exactly the same way. That is, if n > 2, then 
with utility functions u1 and u2 and doctrines D1 and D2, the proof is also con-
cluded. The other doctrines can be defined such that they coincide with either D1 
or D2 with regard to the options mentioned above.
The argument above shows our result in the case in which  is not option 
stratified because property (2) holds. A proof in which  is not option stratified 
because rule (6) holds can also be obtained. Again, we focus on the case n = 2.
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Let u1 : A →  be any function such as u1(x) > u1(y) > u1(z). Let u2 : A →  
be a function such as u2(z) > u2(x). Let D1 be any doctrine such that
 D D D1 1 1({ , }) { }, ({ , }) { }, ({ , }) ,x y x y z y x z= = =and n/a  
and for any other issue B = {w, v}, where w Ï {x, y, z}, v Ï {x, y, z}, or neither w 
nor v belong to {x, y, z},
 either n/a or ifD D1 1 1 1({ , }) ({ , }) { , } ( ) ( ),w v w v w v u w u v= = =  
 either n/a or ifD D1 1 1 1({ , }) ({ , }) { } ( ) ( ),w v w v w u w u v= = >  
and
 either n/a or ifD D1 1 1 1({ , }) ({ , }) { } ( ) ( ).w v w v v u v u w= = >  
Let D2 be any doctrine such that
 D D D2 2 2({ , }) ({ , }) ({ , }) { },x y y z x z z= = =n/a, n/a, and  
and for any other issue B = {w, v}, where w Ï {x, y, z}, v Ï {x, y, z}, or neither w 
nor v belong to {x, y, z},
 either n/a or ifD D2 2 2 2({ , }) ({ , }) { , } ( ) ( ),w v w v w v u w u v= = =  
 either n/a or ifD D2 2 2 2({ , }) ({ , }) { } ( ) ( ),w v w v w u w u v= = >  
and
 either n/a or ifD D2 2 2 2({ , }) ({ , }) { } ( ) ( ).w v w v v u v u w= = >  
By construction, D1 and D2 are conditional option-stratified doctrines. Let α be an 
aggregator that maps conditional option-stratified doctrines into option-stratified 
legal systems and  = α(D1, D2). By unanimity,
   ({ , }) { }, ({ , }) { }, ({ , }) { }.x y x y z y x z z= = =and  
Thus,  is not option stratified.
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